



Will a catch share for whales improve social welfare? 
Martin D. Smith1,2, Frank Asche3, Lori S. Bennear1,2,4, Elizabeth Havice5, Andrew J. Read6, and 
Dale Squires7 
1. Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Box 90328, Durham, NC 27701, 
USA 
2. Department of Economics, Duke University 
3. Department of Industrial Economics, University of Stavanger, 4036 Stavanger, Norway 
4. Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University  
5. Department of Geography, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Saunders Hall, Campus 
Box 3220, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3220, USA 
6. Duke Marine Lab, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 135 Duke Marine 
Lab Road  Beaufort, NC 28516, USA 
7. NOAA Southwest Fisheries Science Center, 8604 La Jolla Shores Drive, La Jolla, CA 
92037-1023, USA 
 




Gerber, Costello, and Gaines (GCG) propose using catch share markets for conservation of 
wildlife. The rationale for a tradable quota system draws on the logic of catch shares to manage 
fisheries harvest and permit trading to control air and water pollution. In many cases, such 
systems have improved management and lowered costs. GCG argue that catch shares can also 
lead to efficient conservation outcomes by allowing environmental groups (NGOs) to purchase 
and retire permits and thereby reduce the commercial harvest activity. They investigate the 
potential to generate conservation gains through a catch share system to manage whales. 
It is well established that creating tradable quota markets can be an effective tool for 
environmental management, although the success of the market (e.g. ‘effectiveness’) depends on 
a range of factors including the institutional setting, the policy design, the specific environmental 
issue in question, and whose values and definitions of ‘effective outcomes’ such programs are 
based upon. The purpose of this paper is to highlight features that would influence the outcome 
of introducing a quota for whales that GCG do not address. These concerns are applicable for 
other possible uses of wildlife conservation markets such as elephants, tigers, and birds that are 
largely transboundardy and require multilateral conservation approaches. We argue that the 
choice to use whales to develop a model for market based conservation requires engagement 
with the specifics of whales and whale management. More generally, any market approach to 
conservation should carefully consider the specifics of the case in question to ensure that the 
appropriate conservation tool is selected and applied. 
There are two distinct strands to our critique of GCG’s analysis. The first strand focuses on 
GCG’s novel use of the market to incorporate conservation values as a method for determining 
the level of conservation. We argue that this is akin to using the market to set the “cap” rather 
than solely using the market to allocate permits under the cap. Use of market-based mechanisms 
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to both set the level of harvest and allocate that harvest has never been tried before and its 
success hinges critically on the ability of the market to accurately reflect all values of the 
managed species, both for private consumption and public conservation. This is particularly 
problematic because most wildlife to which their model may apply, including their example of 
whales, are impure public goods that require multilateral conservation across jurisdictions and 
multiple states. In economics, we use the term impure public goods to refer to goods that 
generate both private value for an individual consumer or firm (e.g. someone who eats whale 
meat or harvests whales) and public value that is shared by all consumers (e.g. the intrinsic value 
of keeping a whale in the ocean).  
To illustrate the concept further, consider the choice between an organically grown apple and 
a conventionally grown apple sprayed with pesticides. We consider the organic apple an impure 
public good because it provides private value to the consumer in the form of enjoyment, nutrition 
from eating the apple, and potential health benefits from avoiding pesticide residues. But it also 
provides public value in the form of avoided pesticide runoff that, in turn, benefits the ecosystem 
downstream. These ecosystem benefits are enjoyed by all consumers and not just by the 
purchaser of the apple. The impure public goods feature of whales has important ramifications 
for the outcome of the modeling exercise in GCG because this feature makes it difficult to raise 
funds to reflect the full value of conservation.  
The second strand of critique focuses on four implementation issues that relate more 
specifically to whales that are not accounted for in GCG’s proposal and model; similar issues 
emerge for other internationally shared wildlife populations. First, the creation of a whale share 
would legitimize the international trade in whale meat, which could expand the whale meat 
market. Consumers of whale products would be better off, but individuals who value whale 
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conservation would be worse off because it becomes harder for conservationists to buy out quota 
and represent conservation values in the market. Second, a legal whale trade creates monitoring 
and enforcement challenges similar to those of organizations that manage highly migratory 
species like tuna and exotic threatened species like rhinoceros. The market for whale products 
may or may not expand in size, but it will be qualitatively different. Third, introducing a catch 
share will likely create a new political economy of management that could change incentives and 
make it significantly more costly for NGOs to achieve the current level of conservation. Unlike 
market legitimization on the demand side, this feature may add pressure to increase harvest and 
expand the market for whale products from the supply side. The political economy of 
management is considerably more complicated in international arenas than in national settings 
where quota systems are most commonly used. Fourth, a whale share program creates new 
logistical challenges for quota definition and allocation regardless of whether the market for 
whale products expands or contracts. For instance, should the quota be set to achieve MSY?  
Most fisheries management defaults to this objective, including the U.S. Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 
We assess the relevance of each of these issues to GCG’s proposal as applied to whales, 
drawing on relevant examples and issues for international fisheries of high value such as the 
management of tuna stocks with Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). Tuna 
RFMOs, while a clear improvement over no international management efforts, highlight some of 
the challenges that a whale shares program would likely face. We assert that controlling these 
issues is outside of the scope of the proposed conservation tool (a quota system). Each issue, if 
left unaddressed, could generate lower overall welfare for society and potentially greater threats 
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to marine mammal conservation than the status quo, complicating GCG’s assertion that the quota 
system will definitively yield maximum efficiency.  
Our analysis is neither prescriptive nor empirical – that is, we are not asserting that any one 
outcome will come to fruition – rather it is designed to highlight that the use of quotas for 
conservation is not a black and white issue, and that treating it as such in the whale context 
obscures the relevance of the contested international politics and economics that have driven 
calls for alternative solutions to the fragile IWC ban in the first place.  
We begin with an overarching critique of GCG’s proposal for the use of cap-and-trade 
programs for conservation. Our critique hinges on the fact that catch share programs (aka ITQs) 
and other cap-and-trade systems are not designed to set an efficient cap; they rely on the ability 
of a regulatory agency or organization to set and enforce the cap (for fisheries, this is the total 
allowable catch) and rely on the market to allocate the shares under that cap. Using the market to 
allocate resources under a cap, for pollution or for fish, can improve management and lower 
costs (Stavins 1998, Grafton 1996, Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008). However, catch shares 
do not address optimal management of whole ecosystems (Arnason 2012), and apparent 
biological gains from catch shares may be attributable other factors, namely the cap itself (as 
opposed to the trading) (Bromley 2009) or changes in reporting systems (Nowliss and Van 
Benthem 2012). Comparing fisheries with catch shares to fisheries with just caps suggests no 
gains in mean biological reference points but benefits in the form reduced variability (Essington 
2010). Above all, having a binding cap that reduces pollution or fishing mortality is critical to 
gain support for these programs from environmental groups (Chan, Stavins, Stowe, & Sweeney, 
2012; Keohane, Revesz, & Stavins, 1998; Stavins, 1998).   
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GCG are proposing something different: allow the setting of the cap based on some 
unspecified scientific criteria and then use the market to shift the actual harvest level to 
approximate the socially efficient harvest level. While some cap-and-trade pollution permit 
systems—in particular the program regulating SO2 emissions in the United States— allow 
environmental groups to purchase permits and retire them, no system of tradable permits has 
ever relied on this mechanism to determine where the cap should be. Retirement of SO2 permits 
has been low, not because environmentalists do not care about SO2 pollution, but because they 
successfully lobbied for a binding cap in the first place. In short, prior catch share and cap-and-
trade systems have been used to reach an agreed upon cap cost-effectively; they have not been 
used to try to assess where the efficient cap should be.  
GCG’s proposal to use the market to determine the level of conservation and the level of 
consumption hinges on the ability of the market to reflect demand for conservation accurately. 
However, this outcome is questionable because most conservation goods, including whales, are 
impure public goods (Kuronuma and Tisdell 1993) that have features of private and public 
goods. Consumption of whales has private features because a whale harvested by one vessel 
cannot be harvested again by another. In contrast, a public good can be enjoyed by many (or all) 
individuals simultaneously. Whales also meet this definition in that more than one individual 
may simultaneously value the existence of the same whale. So, when a whale is harvested, its 
existence value is lost not just by one consumer but by all consumers. Similar claims could be 
made for other charismatic marine and terrestrial species. Moreover, multiple individuals can 
enjoy viewing the same whale on a whale watching trip (either simultaneously or on separate 
trips). Harvesting a whale is a loss to not just one whale watcher but to all whale watchers who 
may see this animal. For public goods, the total value of a unit is the sum of values across all 
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individuals. The policy problem resulting from public goods is that too few of these goods will 
be produced by the free market because of free-rider and collective action problems.  
The free-rider problem is one where individuals do not pay their true values because they can 
still gain use of the resource even if they do not pay for it—they can free ride on the 
contributions of others and there are benefits external to the provider (Samuelson 1954). 
Consider, for example, an individual who values air quality and has a choice between taking the 
bus to work or driving a private car. The car will produce more pollution and lower the air 
quality relative to the bus, but driving the car is less costly to the individual because she can get 
to work faster. For the individual, the benefit to the environment of taking the bus is 
imperceptibly small, but the cost (in terms of time) is noticeable, so the individual often will 
choose the dirty alternative and drive to work. The problem is that that imperceptibly small 
benefit to the environment is a benefit to everyone and not just the individual making the choice. 
But the incentives are set up for her to ignore the benefits to others and let others choose the 
cleaner alternative. Because many other consumers follow the same logic, the air quality ends up 
being lower than everyone would agree it should be. This is the essence of the free rider 
problem. 
The collective action problem results from difficulty in coordinating individuals and pooling 
resources for public goods provision. Consider the car and bus choice again. People do not want 
to choose the bus alternative to get a tiny increase in air quality, but they might be willing to do it 
if there were a substantial increase in air quality. If everyone coordinated and took the bus, the 
air quality would be substantially improved. This is the collective action problem. Correcting the 
free-rider and collective action problems typically requires government provision and taxation. 
Catch share programs do not correct free-rider or collective action problems for public goods 
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provision. Even sole ownership or privatization of an impure public good does not ensure the 
efficient outcome, as private interests could diverge from social interests and drive a stock to 
extinction (Clark 1973). 
GCG acknowledge the public goods nature of conservation and the potential for free riding. 
They suggest that their proposed catch share program could address the public goods problem by 
allowing environmental NGOs the opportunity to use funds to purchase shares, thereby reflecting 
public demand for conservation. However, this ex-post incorporation of conservation demands 
through the free market is unlikely to result in an efficient level of whaling, as it will include 
private demand only, not social demand for conservation. Private demand reflects voluntary 
contributions to a public good summed across individuals (donations to NGOs in this case). 
These contributions reflect free-riding and understate total social demand, which captures the 
total value to society of the public good. For species that are less charismatic than whales, we 
would expect the extent of free-riding to be more severe, suggesting even more limitations of the 
use of catch shares to conserve non-extractive uses of wildlife. 
Figure 1 illustrates this point using the market for whale shares as an example. The figure 
demonstrates that the market would underprovide whale conservation because the private 
demand (i.e. demand reflecting voluntary contributions to NGOs) lies below the social demand. 
Consistent with GCG, we assume that the International Whaling Commission (IWC) or another 
institution sets a safe minimum population level and that this population is at least as large as the 
population that produces MSY. As such, equilibrium harvest is strictly decreasing in the whale 
population; as population increases from the MSY-level toward carrying capacity, the surplus 
production available for harvest decreases. Allowing NGOs to raise funds for conservation and 
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purchase shares would result in a stock of whales at the market equilibrium that is below the 
social optimum.  
One might argue that the free-rider problem is small for whales. GCG suggest that this may 
be true because voluntary contributions to whale conservation appear high in absolute terms, 
perhaps indicating that NGOs have successfully gotten contributors to donate close to their true 
values. However, large contributions do not necessarily indicate that NGOs have overcome free 
riding because NGOs have no sovereign authority to tax; large contributions could mean that 
NGOs have raised a small fraction of a very large social demand for conservation. Consistent 
with a potentially very large willingness to pay for whale conservation, Lew et al. (2010) show 
that willingness to pay for conservation of another marine mammal, Steller sea lion, is in the 
range of $10 billion per year for U.S. households. If NGOs were able to raise this level of 
funding for each whale species and other species of wildlife managed with catch shares, the issue 
of free riding would be much less of a concern.  
The use of a market to establish the level of harvest could be efficient if there were some 
mechanism to capture consumer’s true willingness to pay for conservation. In other contexts, 
such as water markets, this mechanism has not materialized; allocation of water to the 
environment is done by government (not NGOs), and water trading is a means to allocate what is 
left for agricultural and municipal uses cost-effectively. Debates about wildlife catch shares thus 
mirror debates about water trading: “attention must be paid to water’s unique and public good 
characteristics. Those who caution against haphazard market formation are not necessarily 
opponents; once basic uses of water (human and environmental water needs) are met, water 
markets are an efficient mechanism for dealing with the scarcity of the remaining elective uses of 
water” (Chong and Sunding, 2006, p. 260).    
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As one of the few acceptable deviations from the IWC moratorium on whaling, aboriginal 
subsistence whaling (ASW) raises a different set of public goods issues. ASW is acceptable 
because whaling is essential to maintain these cultures, so cultures themselves become public 
goods in the discourse. Under the current IWC, these cultural public goods are deemed more 
desirable than the environmental public goods lost from whales taken by ASW. GCG make a 
distinction between two different uses of whales when stating, “If we assume that there is an 
extremely high value to harvest even a few whales, the choke price grows, suggesting that the 
ASW will not sell all quota to conservationists” (p. 13). GCG do not appear to acknowledge the 
public good nature of the aboriginal whaling as a means to maintain the culture and the world’s 
value of these cultures. The rest of the world attaches some value to preservation of aboriginal 
cultures and not just members of aboriginal societies.  
A separate but related question is whether cultural heritage of commercial whaling has a 
public good component. The past decisions of IWC suggest that allocation of quota to 
aboriginals is acceptable, but it is not acceptable to sustain coastal cultures by allowing whaling 
in modern societies like Japan and Norway. This record reinforces our claim that the only reason 
for allocating whale quotas for ASW is the public good aspect. If any group that has been 
allocated quota under these circumstances has anything to sell, this implies that the IWC has 
awarded them too much quota or that the aboriginals are willing to give up their culture for a 
large enough sum of money while the international society will not let them. This potential 
conflict raises questions of sovereignty that are beyond our scope. 
We now turn to the second strand of our critique, which emphasizes four implementation 
issues specific to the GCG proposal as applied to whales, but with broad relevance to 
international wildlife conservation. First, a resumption of internationally sanctioned whaling 
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beyond indigenous and scientific use could stimulate demand for whale meat and other products. 
Currently, whales are caught and commercially consumed in only four countries, Iceland, Japan, 
Norway and South Korea. All whales are listed by CITES such that trade is illegal except for 
countries entering “reservations” (http://www.cites.org/eng/app/reserve_intro.php). With legal 
harvesting under sustainable management, whale meat could expand into new markets. A 
counterpoint to this concern is the claim that the general decline in market value of whale 
products is largely responsible for stabilized whale populations (Schneider and Pearce 2004).  
Other species provide examples of the power of increased demand. In fisheries, Atlantic 
Bluefin tuna illustrates both sides of the issue. Prior to the 1970s, a commercial fishery for 
Atlantic Bluefin tuna did not exist in the U.S. because the U.S. did not have access to the 
Japanese market (Bestor 2001). Technological innovations and changing trade relations allowed 
a growing U.S. fishery to access the high-value Japanese market, generating significant fishery 
values. When the Japanese economy weakened in the 1990s, a domestic U.S. market emerged in 
conjunction with growing U.S. consumer taste for sushi (Bestor 2001). Now Atlantic Bluefin 
face significant conservation challenges. Would society have been better off without the 
development of the fishery and diffusion of taste for sushi tuna? The answer depends in part on 
whether the charismatic Bluefin contribute significant value as public goods and whether these 
values outweigh the expanded private values from sushi tuna consumption. Product 
development, improved logistics, and better refrigeration similarly have expanded global markets 
for many other seafood species (Asche et al. 2011), albeit ones that do not appear to be as 
charismatic as elephants, whales, and Atlantic Bluefin.  
There are two mechanisms through which market legitimization could stimulate demand and 
lower welfare. The first is the concept of experience goods: consumers tend to consume more of 
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products with which they have experience. Currently, consumers in most of the world have no 
opportunity to experience whale products, but they may gain these opportunities under a whale 
shares program. There has been dramatic globalization of the international seafood trade in the 
past several decades (Smith et al. 2010), suggesting possibilities for trade in whale products are 
far greater than they were before the IWC moratorium. There are competing behavioral 
explanations for the experience goods phenomenon. One is that consumer tastes are malleable 
and can be shaped by framing and other manipulations of marketers (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
The other explanation is that consumer tastes for product attributes are unchanging, but by trying 
new products people gain knowledge or appreciation for the attributes of a product and then 
demand more (Stigler and Becker 1977). We do not take sides in this behavioral debate but point 
out that both views support the possibility of increased market demand for whale products. 
Although the current demand for whale meat in Japan is relatively small, there exists a high-end 
premium market (Onozaka and Uchida 2011). Whether consumer interest in whale meat would 
diffuse internationally as consumers gain access to experience eating whales is an open question, 
but experiences with sushi products suggest this possibility. 
The second mechanism through which market legitimization could stimulate demand and 
lower welfare is how the creation of a price for whale would affect consumer social norms. 
Currently, there is no whale meat price for consumers in most of the world. Behavioral 
economists have shown that creating a price for something where previously behavior was 
regulated by social norms can have the unintended consequence of increasing consumption. A 
classic example is the use of late fees in Israeli daycares; when there were no late fees, parents 
were more likely to pick up their kids on time, so creating the price incentive backfired (Gneezy 
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and Rustichini 2000). A whale share effectively prices whales where no prices existed before, 
and this pricing may send a signal that consumption is socially acceptable.   
Despite the potential benefits to consumers when demand for whale products increases, 
overall social welfare can decrease (Figure 1(b)). Any growth in private demand, holding 
everything else constant, could only lead to harvesting more whales in equilibrium. This 
outcome will always lower social welfare as long as the public goods value of conserving an 
additional whale exceeds the private value of consuming it.  
Our second implementation critique is that creation of a whale share program will legitimize 
whaling in the international community and create new monitoring and enforcement challenges. 
Under the status quo, there is very limited legal international trade in whale products; whale 
products traded internationally are illegal other than trades between countries registering 
reservations under CITES. A legal trade in whale products would raise the many challenges 
associated with controlling illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing (Sumaila, Alder, 
and Keith 2006). Among these is the difficulty distinguishing between legally caught and 
illegally caught whale meat and other products. Certification would potentially aid in delineating 
legal and illegal harvest, but this suggests that a well-functioning whale share program would 
require developing new institutions. Moreover, the efficacy of these new institutions would be a 
concern, as genetic testing suggests certification in fisheries does not ensure a clean supply chain 
(Marko, Nance, and Guynn 2011). International management of other charismatic wildlife 
species faces similar challenges. For example, there is empirical evidence that trade bans for 
ivory would be more effective in promoting elephant conservation than allowing legal ivory 
trade despite theoretical arguments for and against bans  (Bulte and Van Kooten AJAE 2006). A 
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catch share for whales with a trade ban would likely produce very different outcomes than the 
same catch share without a trade ban. 
Figure 1(c) demonstrates how a whale share program creates incentives for illegal harvest. 
Whale shares decrease social welfare in most scenarios, and social welfare improvements are not 
attributable to share trading but instead are artifacts of setting safe minimum standards, initial 
allocations, or, providing perverse incentives for illegal trade.  
Enforcement also hinges on the ability of the IWC to set and enforce a cap. In their 2012 
paper the authors assert that the IWC is “up to the task” (Costello, Gaines, and Gerber, Nature 
pg. 140). However, by their own account, since the 1990s and under the auspices of the IWC’s 
moratorium on commercial whaling, the number of whales taken has more than doubled, many 
populations of whales have been severely depleted and continue to be threatened by what GCG 
call “largely unregulated” whaling and an IWC “long hamstrung by management and ethics 
issues” (Costello, Gaines, and Gerber, p. 139). This is important context because the IWC’s 
fragility is the reason that GCC have made their proposal, but the fragility is ignored in their 
model. Another critical enforcement issue is that rights-based management must be self-
enforcing because without a supranational sovereign body, multilateral cooperation, compliance, 
and enforcement are through voluntary agreement among IWC members (Barrett 2003). A trade 
that shifts the quota in either direction under GCG’s proposal would not require agreement 
among IWC members, raising questions about the stability of the catch share program.  
The above analysis illustrates that there are a number of cases in which a whale share 
program could lower social welfare. Most importantly, cases in which whale shares would 
increase welfare are artifacts of setting the cap and not of the trading program. Thus, the 
dynamics that determine the cap become a crucial dimension for evaluating the potential for a 
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whale share program to improve the status quo. To the extent that the current political economy 
of setting caps in the IWC is problematic, a whale share program does not appear to change this 
dynamic. Thus our third implementation critique surrounds the political challenges to 
establishing the cap in an already politically fraught international arena.  
A key concern for a new cap and trade program is how implementing a cap and an intention 
to allocate access and catch rights can generate a scramble to secure a share of the resource. 
Experience from cooperatively managed tuna fisheries is illustrative. When the International 
Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) was established, Commission 
members with Bluefin fleets negotiated measures to exclude outsiders and codify historically and 
geographically determined access rights (Webster 2010). There were few new entrants until 
ICCAT established country-specific quotas in the mid-1990s. ICCAT membership had hovered 
between 10 and 20 from 1970-1995, but after the cap was introduced (and tuna value increased) 
membership jumped dramatically to 48 member countries by 2010 (http://www.iccat.int/en/). 
Similarly, when the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was 
negotiated, fishing nations in Europe and Latin America that were not regularly active in the 
region sought membership and participation rights.  
While the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) establishes that participation in 
such programs for fish should be open to those with a “real interest,” the criterion of “real 
interest” is not defined in the UNFSA. Real interest has not been defined for whales, and whales 
may be considered part of the global heritage of humanity in a manner similar to the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) and sovereignty and management of the Area. Although 
there are frameworks that limit participation in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, 
the IWC is open to all states, greatly complicating the issues of “real interest,” closure, and 
16 
 
allocation. Do entrants after the initial allocation have legitimate interests in rights and how 
should they participate? Undoubtedly, entry into the IWC will increase with catch shares, raising 
issues of recurring reallocation, duration, and divisibility of the right. The resulting uncertainty 
for rights holders could lower the value of the property rights and hinders investment for both 
commercial whalers and NGOs. States formally objecting to their allocation might not be bound 
by any cap. The creation of rights with real value could even prompt a revision to the IWC akin 
to the ISA in which whales are redefined to constitute part of the global heritage of all states. 
Whales would then be collectively managed as a global public good, similar to minerals in the 
deep seabed by the ISA, including payments of royalties and conservation requirements. This is 
not an argument against whale shares per se but suggests that potential gains are qualitatively 
different from those modeled in GCG. 
Moreover, geopolitical interests that may diverge or be distinct from the management 
objectives at hand can influence the cap and quota allocation in unpredictable ways, particularly 
in an international negotiating arena. This dynamic is familiar at the IWC where votes become 
political capital that small states use to derive economic benefit from those IWC members with 
vested interest in outcomes (Stringer 2006). Replacing the IWC’s fragile moratorium with cap-
and-trade does not guarantee that the geopolitical entanglements that have generated the current 
stalemate will be eliminated. To draw on one example, geopolitical influences on participation 
and voting have contributed to frustrated efforts to limit mortality on tuna species at the WCPFC. 
Further, where effort controls are in place, allocation processes introduce a second layer of 
geopolitical considerations: fishing nations use management and access negotiations to earn 
regional influence; offers of aid, investment and infrastructure are reported to reduce the 
stringency of enforcement (Havice and Campling 2010).  
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The fourth implementation issue is that a whale share program creates new logistical 
challenges for quota definition and allocation regardless of whether the market for whale 
products expands or contracts. Once whaling is legitimized in the international community, 
pressure might well grow to manage whale stocks for MSY, the default approach for most 
fisheries management. While admittedly speculative, such a policy would greatly increase the 
total allowable catch of whales relative to the status quo for species such as Minke whales and 
could exacerbate underprovision of public goods as Figure 1 illustrates. To the extent that stocks 
of other whale species recover, pressure could be brought to open these stocks to harvest.  
The selection of whale species subject to a catch share is complex. Harvesting species under 
rebuilding programs or at critically low population levels can be counter-productive. Catch 
shares on species with low population levels can mean that the number of vessels exceeds the 
desired limit, catches are rare events, it is not possible to allocate the total catch across vessels, 
and group rather than individual rights are required (Segerson 2011). Fleets under whale shares 
may need to pool shares and coordinate efforts. Whether to specify catch shares to individual 
species or groups of species (e.g. “blue whale units”) raises the rare events problem again and 
discordance between catch limits and mortality rates for individual species and substitution 
between species in a composite unit.  
Catch rights in international agreements are complicated because they include two rights in a 
multilateral self-enforcing commission: the catch right and an access right (Squires et al. in 
press). The access right can be to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) reflecting individual 
national sovereignty or to the high seas under IWC auspices. The catch right may be bundled 
with or separate from the access right. Rights may have to be issued first to states and then to 
individuals because of the sovereignty of states both within their EEZs and as the primary actors 
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in the IWC. If rights are first issued to individuals, then states may well assert their sovereignty 
as with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission’s capacity program.  
Allocation is the most contentious element of any catch share program. Are rights allocated 
to nations and then vessels or directly to vessels? Which nations can receive allocations, and do 
coastal developing states receive particular consideration because of their EEZs in which whales 
spend all or part of their lives? It is essential to start an allocation of rights by closing the pool of 
participants to which rights are allocated but allow entry by new states. Limited duration can 
accommodate entry into the process and mitigates the tensions that otherwise arise when states 
perceive their sovereignty to have been circumscribed.  Compliance and enforcement are 
necessary components of any allocation agreement, and must be considered as part of the 
agreement and initial allocation. Because the IWC is voluntary and requires multilateral 
cooperation for success (Barrett 2003), failure to solve the allocation issue would undermine 
self-enforcement. 
In conclusion, market-based policies like catch shares have an important role to play in 
marine conservation, but the details are tremendously important particularly in the international 
arena for global impure public goods. In the case of whale shares, the policy will be unable to 
achieve a social optimum unless the IWC happens to set the cap close the optimal (though 
difficult to calculate) level. Only under these circumstances do potential gains from quota trading 
emerge because NGOs can raise sufficient funds to move the quota. The potential for catch 
shares to mimic the social optimum is considerably lower for less charismatic species, as NGOs 
have more difficulty fund raising in these cases. Qualitatively, there are many possible pathways 
through which the policy would lower social welfare: free riding in the private demand for 
conservation, stimulating demand for whale products that moves the market outcome further 
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from the social optimum, creating new enforcement challenges, and additional pressures on the 
political economy of setting the cap and allocation of the rights. Catch shares in the international 
arena face very different circumstances than national programs, and the latter do not simply 
translate to the international arena. Several key factors differ from national programs: multiple 
jurisdictions, international law, the sovereignty of nations,  and the necessity of self-enforcing 
multilateral cooperation. Establishing who has “real interest” will be crucial and may well evolve 
with the introduction of rights. 
A successful whale share policy, at minimum, requires a mechanism to collect voluntary 
contributions to whale conservation that do not fall short of the social demand due to free riding 
and an enforcement mechanism that can distinguish between legally and illegally traded whale 
products. In contrast, there are only a handful of pathways through which whale shares would 
increase social welfare, and these are artifacts of where the cap is set and not attributable to 
trading shares per se. Nevertheless, no one can say with certainty what the outcome of a whale 
shares proposal would be for whale stocks and marine conservation more broadly. There is risk 
in staying with the status quo stalemate, but there is also risk in adopting a new policy approach. 
Empirically understanding the pathways through which a whale share would increase or decrease 
social welfare is an important direction for future consideration.  
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Figure 1 – Market outcomes and the social optimum. (a) The free market underprovides 
whale conservation. The market equilibrium for whale shares is at the intersection of Private 
Demand for Conservation (voluntary contributions to NGOs) and Demand for Whaling where 
the resulting population is N_market. The optimal population is at the intersection of Social 
Demand for Conservation and Demand for Whaling (N_optimal). N_market is above the safe 
minimum population (N_min) but below N_optimal. A higher Social Demand for Conservation 
could lead to the optimal population being at carrying capacity K, while a higher Demand for 
Whaling could lead to a market equilibrium population at N_min. (b) Growth in demand for 
whale meat exacerbates underprovision of conservation. An increase in demand from Old 
Demand for Whaling to New Demand for Whaling decreases the equilibrium whale population 
from A to B. Consumers of whale products gain area ABCF. Conservation interests lose area 
ABDE. The net loss to society would be area FCDE. How large or small this loss would be is an 
empirical question. (c) A minimum population level above the free market outcome incentivizes 
illegal harvest. Consider three possible safe minimum population levels: N_min (below market 
equilibrium), N_min1 (between market equilibrium and the social optimum), and N_min2 
(above the social optimum). At N_min, trade could increase social welfare by moving in the 
direction of the social optimum but would stop short at point A with no incentive for illegal 
harvest. The net gain is an artifact of setting the minimum population level below the market 
equilibrium and allocating rights to the harvest industry. With N_min1, Private Demand for 
Conservation is below the Demand for Whaling. At equilibrium population N_min1, the price 
wedge between Private Demand for Conservation and Demand for Whaling incentivizes illegal 
harvest. Illegal harvest would decrease the population further away from the social optimum. 
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Incentives for illegal harvest are larger at N_min2 (a larger wedge). Illegal harvest and 
associated decreases in the whale population could move the population toward (and not away 
from) the social optimum. This perversion suggests that welfare gains are not associated with the 
whale share program but rather with the way it happens to create incentives for illegal harvest 
that end up pushing the system closer to the social optimum. Of course, depending on the extent 
of illegal whaling, the population could diminish below the social optimum, and social welfare 
could be lower. At N_min1 and N_min2, demand growth exacerbates these problems, creating 











Figure 1 – Market outcomes and the social optimum. 
